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Abstract 
 Standard dual process models in the action domain postulate that stimulus-driven 
processes are responsible for suboptimal behavior because they take them to be rigid and 
automatic and therefore the default. We propose an alternative dual process model in which 
goal-directed processes are the default instead. We then transfer the dual process logic from 
the action domain to the emotion domain. This reveals that emotional action tendencies are 
often attributed to stimulus-driven processes. Our alternative model submits that emotional 
action tendencies can also be caused by goal-directed processes. We evaluate the type of 
empirical evidence required for validating our model and we consider implications of our 
model for behavior change, encouraging strategies focused on the expectancies and values of 
action outcomes.  
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The power of Goal-directed Processes in the Causation of Emotional and Other Actions 
People often engage in behavior that is not in their best interest, so-called irrational or 
suboptimal behavior. For instance, they engage in unhealthy behavior such as smoking; they 
commit action slips such as taking a wrong habitual route; or they become aggressive even 
when they risk a high cost (e.g., retaliation or ruining a relationship). Smoking and taking the 
wrong route have been framed as the result of (bad) habits, and are typically cited in the 
domain of action research. Costly aggression falls in the domain of emotion research, and 
people committing to this kind of aggression have been said to be in the grip of an emotion 
(anger). To explain dissociations between optimal and suboptimal behavior, theorists in both 
the domains of action and emotion have come up with dual process models in which goal-
directed processes are responsible for much of our optimal behavior and stimulus-driven 
processes are more likely to lead to suboptimal behavior. 
The aim of this article is two-fold. The first aim is to challenge standard dual process 
models in the action literature in which stimulus-driven processes are assumed to be the 
driving force of suboptimal behavior. The main source of this assumption, in our view, is the 
postulate that stimulus-driven processes are rigid but automatic and therefore the default type 
of process whereas goal-directed processes are flexible but only operate under special 
conditions. Based on a rejection of this postulate, we present an alternative dual process 
model, which takes goal-directed rather than stimulus-driven processes to be the default type 
of process. This amounts to reducing the explanatory territory of stimulus-driven processes 
and expanding that of goal-directed ones.  
The second aim is to extend our analysis from the action domain to the emotion 
domain. This exercise reveals that the causation of emotional action tendencies is often 
conceptualized in terms of stimulus-driven rather than goal-directed processes. Here too then, 
stimulus-driven processes are considered the default type of process whereas goal-directed 
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processes are confined to a secondary, regulatory role. The alternative model that we put 
forward, however, proposes to also consider goal-directed processes as a potential cause of 
initial emotional action tendencies.  
After our theoretical analysis, we evaluate some of the existing empirical work in 
light of standard dual process models and our alternative model, and we make suggestions for 
future empirical research aimed at pitting both models against each other more directly. We 
close by elaborating on the implications of our alternative model for behavior change in 
clinical practice and society. 
Dual Process Models in the Action Domain 
Dual process models in the action domain distinguish between goal-directed and 
stimulus-driven processes. A goal-directed process assesses the utility of one or more action 
options. The utility of an action option is based on (a) a representation of the value of the 
outcome of the action, which in turn, depends on the motivational state or desire of the 
organism, and (b) a representation of the contingency between the action and the outcome, 
also called the expectancy or the belief that the action will lead to the outcome (Heyes & 
Dickinson, 1993). The action option with the highest utility activates its corresponding action 
tendency (i.e., goal to act), and this action tendency may or may not translate in an overt 
action. If it results in an overt action, that action is said to be under the control of its expected 
and desired outcomes (i.e., expected goals) and is called an instrumental action. The sequence 
from stimulus input (S) over representations to response output (R) can be formalized as 
follows (with the content of representations inside square brackets, and observable inputs and 
outputs outside these brackets)1:  
                                                     
1 The term stimulus may cover any aspect of the environment that is taken as the input of a process. The term 
action is understood broadly as overt behavior and motor responses. The term outcome refers to a stimulus that 
is caused by an action. The term goal refers to the representation of a valued or desired outcome.  
In this manuscript, we adopt the common practice to define instrumental behavior and reactions at a 
mental level of analysis, that is, in terms of the mental processes causing them. Note that these concepts can also 
be defined at an observable or functional level of analysis (see De Houwer, 2011): Instrumental behavior can be 
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S→[S:R1-O1v] [S:R2-O2v]→ [R1]→R1 
The first two representations contain the utilities of two action options (R1 and R2), 
each connected to a unique valued outcome (O1v and O2v) to a certain degree. The third 
representation ([R1]) contains an action, and is called an action tendency or goal to act. More 
complex formulas are possible with more action options connected to multiple action 
outcomes. But the minimal requirement for a process to count as goal-directed is that at least 
one action option is represented together with its expectancy for one valued outcome.2  
It is insightful to embed the goal-directed process in a cycle in line with cybernetic 
models of action control (Carver & Scheier, 1990; Ridderinkhof, this issue). Each cycle starts 
with the comparison between a stimulus (actual state) and a first goal (i.e., representation of a 
valued outcome). If a discrepancy is detected, the organism strives to reduce the discrepancy 
(i.e., a second goal), either by acting (i.e., assimilation), by choosing a different first goal 
(i.e., accommodation), or by biasing the interpretation of the outcome (i.e., immunization; 
Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 2002). The utility of acting in general and of specific action 
options determines whether and which action tendency (i.e., third goal) will be activated. If 
an action tendency is activated and translated into overt action (i.e., assimilation), the 
outcome of this action feeds back to the comparator where it constitutes the stimulus input to 
the next cycle. New cycles are run until there is no discrepancy left. Cybernetic models 
further assume that people must balance multiple goals, which implies that several cycles 
may run in parallel. Moreover, they assume a hierarchical organisation such that cycles for 
lower-order goals are embedded in cycles for higher-order goals. That is, the discrepancy 
with a lower-order goal can be considered as a stimulus that is itself discrepant with a higher-
order goal. The goal to keep multiple lower-order goals in balance is an example of such a 
                                                     
defined as behavior that is a function of its consequences, and a reaction (or habit) as behavior that is a function 
of the antecedent stimulus. Both types of definitions may yield non-overlapping sets of behavior.  
2 Note that on this narrow definition of goal-directed, the activation of a goal to act via a goal priming procedure 
does not count as a goal-directed process.  
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higher-order goal (see also Carver & Scheier, 1990; Gross, 2015; Saunder, Milyavskaya, & 
Inzlicht, 2015; Webb et al., 2012).  
In contrast to the goal-directed process, a stimulus-driven process involves the 
activation of a pre-existing association between the representation of a specific stimulus and 
the representation of a specific action. The stimulus representation can be made up of a single 
feature or a collection of features, and it can be activated by any stimulus that shares features 
with it. The action representation can be considered as an action tendency3, which may or 
may not translate in overt action. Here, the action is said to be under the control of the 
antecedent stimulus, and is sometimes called a re-action instead of an action. The sequence of 
events can be formalized as follows:  
S→[S-R]→R. 
The representations in both goal-directed and stimulus-driven processes can come 
about via multiple routes. The representation of an S:R-Ov link can be installed via an operant 
conditioning procedure in which a response to a stimulus is followed by an outcome (e.g., a 
person may touch the hot stove and feel pain), but it may also be installed via verbal 
instructions, observation, or logical inference (Heyes & Dickinson, 1993).  
The representation of an S-R link can also come into existence via multiple routes. 
Some S-R links are innate: An unconditional stimulus (US, e.g., a loud noise) is wired 
together with an unconditional response (UR, e.g., to startle) from birth. Other S-R links are 
acquired via an overtrained operant conditioning procedure: When a response to a stimulus is 
extensively followed by the same outcome, the representation of the outcome is assumed to 
be no longer activated or even erased. Such a response is called a habit. Another way to 
install a S-R link is via an associative learning procedure: The mere co-occurence of a 
                                                     
3 Here we follow James (1890) in that we do not make a distinction between a goal representation of an action 
and a mere representation of an action. James (1890) suggested that all representations of actions are inherently 
impulsive: Once activated they translate into overt action unless they are overpowered by a competing 
representation or physical circumstances.   
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stimulus and a response is supposed to lead to the binding of their representations (Hebb, 
1949).4 Still another route that has been proposed for the installation of an S-R link is the 
formation of an implementation intention (Gollwitzer & Sheeran, 2006) also called the 
prepared reflex (Hommel, 2000). An implementation intention is a goal to engage in a 
concrete action (e.g., leave the party) upon the occurrence of a concrete stimulus (e.g., when 
the clock sounds at midnight). It thus takes the form of an S-R link. Once the S-R link is put 
into place, the mere presence of the stimulus should suffice to activate this link and produce a 
response. Several findings, however, suggest that the intention has to remain active for the S-
R link to produce a response (e.g., Sheeran, Webb, & Gollwitzer, 2005). On this 
interpretation, the stimulus-driven process is not merely preceded by, but remains embedded 
in a goal-directed process.  
Standard dual process models assume that stimulus-driven processes are the driving 
force of suboptimal behavior. This assumption is rooted in the postulate that there is a trade-
off between optimality and automaticity (Strack & Deutsch, 2004). Optimality refers to the 
degree of goal satisfaction that a process can bring about; automaticity refers to the number 
of conditions a process requires for its operation (e.g., time, attention, the intention to engage 
in the process; Moors & De Houwer, 2006). This trade-off is linked with the degree of 
complexity and hence flexibility/rigidity of the processes. Goal-directed processes are more 
complex, which makes them less automatic, but in return more flexible and therefore more 
likely to produce optimal behavior. Stimulus-driven processes are more simple, which makes 
them more automatic, but in return more rigid and therefore more liable to produce 
suboptimal actions in some cases (depending on the suitability of the pre-existing S-R link for 
the current occasion).  
                                                     
4 An associative learning procedure (i.e., pairings of stimuli) is typically part of an operant learning procedure, 
but it can also occur in isolation, that is, without the presentation of an outcome.  
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The implication is that when operating conditions are poor (e.g., there is little time or 
attention), the organism is entirely at the mercy of stimulus-driven processes, which often 
result in suboptimal behavior. But even when operating conditions are ample, it is assumed 
that goal-directed processes can at best jump in at a later stage to regulate (refine or correct) 
the action tendency that was initially produced by a stimulus-driven process (e.g., Wood & 
Neal, 2007). Some standard dual process models propose a default-interventionist 
architecture in which the stimulus-driven process is the default process, whereas goal-
directed processes only occur under special conditions (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Wood & 
Rünger, 2016). Other standard dual process models propose a parallel-competitive 
architecture in which both types of processes constantly operate in parallel, but compete to 
determine behavior (Daw, Niv, & Dayan, 2005; Lee, Shimojo, & O’Doherty, 2014). Even in 
the latter models, however, the stimulus-driven process is expected to often win the 
competition because it is faster to produce a response.  
Alternative Dual Process Model 
Like standard dual process models in the action domain, we divide the realm of 
processes into goal-directed and stimulus-driven processes based on the content of the 
representations involved ([S:R-Ov] vs. [S-R]). Most standard dual process models, however, 
go further in that they map this content-based dichotomy onto other dichotomies (Keren & 
Schul, 2009; Moors, 2014a). In the dual process models discussed, the dichotomy of 
stimulus-driven vs. goal-directed is typically mapped onto the dichotomy of automatic vs. 
nonautomatic. We challenge this mapping and submit that goal-directed processes can be 
fairly automatic too. Although we do recognize that stimulus-driven processes are simple and 
therefore likely to survive poor operating conditions, we do not discard the possibility that 
goal-directed processes can also arise under these conditions. Three arguments add credence 
to this position. First, goal-directed processes range from simple to complex and the simpler 
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ones (involving fewer action options and outcomes) are less likely to suffer from a paucity of 
operating conditions than the more complex ones (involving multiple action options and 
outcomes). Precisely how much complexity is possible under poor operating conditions is a 
question that must be studied in empirical research. There are already indications that 
complex information integration can be fast, unintentional, and even unconscious (Bechara, 
Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1997; Hassin, 2013; Mudrik, Faivre, & Koch, 2014). For 
instance, Bechara et al. (1997) showed that participants were able to choose options with  
higher utilities without being able to consciously report on the more advantageous choice. 
This indicates that people can make unconscious estimates about optimal decisions. Second, 
we argue that the goals in goal-directed processes can partly compensate for the lack of other 
conditions (Moors, 2016). Support for this argument comes from studies in which subliminal 
priming effects occurred for goal-relevant but not goal-irrelevant primes (Tapia, Breitmeyer, 
& Schooner, 2010; see reviews by Eitam & Higgins, 2010, and Moors, 2016). This suggests 
that the goal-relevant stimuli were processed despite of the fact that they were masked and 
little time was available for processing them. Third, we not only reject the mapping of the 
stimulus-driven vs. goal-directed dichotomy (based on the content of representations) onto 
the automatic vs. nonautomatic dichotomy (based on the number of necesary operating 
conditions), but also onto the associative vs. rule-based dichotomy (based on the types of 
operations acting on representations; Sloman, 1996). One of the reasons why authors may 
resist abandoning the mapping of the first two dichotomies is that they link both to this third 
dichotomy (e.g., Wood & Neal, 2007, p. 844). However, if one accepts that goal-directed 
processes can also rely on computationally less taxing associative processes, the possibility of 
them being automatic becomes more intuitive. 
If goal-directed processes can be fairly automatic too, there must be a substantial 
number of cases in which goal-directed and stimulus-driven processes are both able to 
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operate in parallel. This is consistent with the parallel-competitive architecture of those 
standard dual process models that assume that both processes operate in parallel and then 
compete to determine behavior (Daw et al., 2005; Lee et al., 2014). Yet while these standard 
models assume that stimulus-driven processes should often win the competition (see above), 
we submit that goal-directed processes should win the competition instead. This is because 
goal-directed processes combine automaticity with optimality, whereas stimulus-driven ones 
only deliver automaticity. Thus, we submit that goal-directed processes should be the default 
process: The system should prioritize processes that are most likely to lead to optimal 
behavior unless it is hindered to do so. If one further assumes that the complete absence of 
goals is unlikely, there does not seem much room to be filled by stimulus-driven processes. 
We think their influence may be limited to (at least) two cases. A first case is when the goal 
to act was only specified at an abstract, superordinate level, leaving the specific stimulus-
response mappings open. Here, the stimulus-driven process does not enter in competition 
with the goal-directed process so that it does not risk being overruled, and therefore gets to 
determine behavior. Take the case of an action slip in which a person takes a wrong habitual 
route that is blocked due to road works since a few days. It is possible that the superordinate 
goal to go to work was activated, but not the subordinate goals about the specific turns to 
take, thus leaving room for the habitual process to steer behavior5. This idea received support 
from studies on implementation intentions (Eder, 2011; Gollwitzer  & Sheeran, 2006) in 
which it was shown that (presumably) stimulus-driven behavior (e.g., approaching positive 
stimuli) is better counteracted when the superordinate goal to counteract this behavior is 
supplemented with a subordinate goal (i.e., an implementation intention) that specifies a 
different S-R mapping (e.g., “if a red frame appears, avoid positive stimuli”). This indicates 
                                                     
5 Note that in other examples of action slips, the behavior may or may not be stimulus-driven. Take the case of a 
person who jumps in her car to go shopping but ends up driving to work instead. This behavior may be 
attributed to an S-R link (being in the car activates driving to work), but it may also be attributed to an S:R-O 
link (being in the car activates the goal to be at work and the responses needed to get there). 
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that stimulus-driven processes can impact behavior if they are not counteracted by 
subordinate goals that are framed at the same level of abstraction as the stimulus-driven 
process. A second case in which the stimulus-driven process may determine behavior is when 
operating conditions (e.g., time, attention) are extremely poor so that even simple goal-
directed processes may not run or may not be completed. Note that it is difficult to 
empirically determine whether an action triggered under poor conditions was caused by a 
stimulus-driven process or by an incomplete or malfunctioning goal-directed process. If time 
and attentional resources are scarce, a person may launch a goal-directed process but be 
forced to act before the process is completed.  
In conclusion, the alternative view that we propose sees a smaller explanatory 
territory for stimulus-driven processes to the benefit of goal-directed ones. This implies that 
most of the competition does not occur between stimulus-driven and goal-directed processes, 
but instead between different goal-directed processes. Which process wins the competition is 
not only determined by complexity proportional to operating conditions, but also by the 
values and expectancies of outcomes.  
Standard dual process models of action have documented various ways in which goal-
directed and stimulus-driven processes can interface (e.g., Kotabe & Hoffmann, 2015; Wood 
& Neal, 2007; Wood & Rünger, 2016). For instance, stimulus-driven processes can result 
from overtrained goal-directed ones (cf. operant conditioning); they can be preceded or 
embedded in goal-directed ones (cf. implementation intentions); and they can interact when 
operating at the same time. By pointing at interfaces between goal-directed and stimulus-
driven processes, authors acknowledge that behavior in daily life is often determined by a 
mixture of processes and that isolating either of them is difficult. In this way, they already go 
some way in reducing the territory of purely stimulus-driven processes. But talking about 
interfaces does not question the existence of the two processes in the interface, nor the 
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standard way of characterizing them (i.e., stimulus-driven as automatic, goal-directed as 
nonautomatic). The alternative model that we propose does not question the existence of both 
processes, but it does question the standard way of characterizing them. This leads to an even 
stronger reduction of the explanatory territory of stimulus-driven processes compared to 
standard models.  
Application to the Emotion Domain 
 In the present section, we analyze emotion theories through the goggles of the dual 
process models from the action domain. In the emotion domain, a contrast is often drawn 
between instrumental actions and emotional actions (Baumeister, 1997; Berkowitz, 1993). 
For instance, a father may raise his voice to make a child obey (i.e., an instrumental action) or 
he may perform the same behavior out of anger (i.e., an emotional action). Instrumental 
actions are thought to be caused by the same goal-directed processes as those invoked in the 
action literature. There is less consensus, however, about the processes causing emotional 
actions. In common sense explanations (and theories that try to vindicate them, e.g., 
Scarantino, this issue), emotional actions are said to be caused by emotions (e.g., aggressive 
behavior is caused by anger)–end of story. According to contemporary emotion theories in 
psychology, however, emotional actions are not caused by, but rather part of, emotions. 
These theories conceptualize emotions as episodes in which the processing of certain 
stimulus features gives rise to an action tendency. The action tendency activates 
physiological responses, and together they prepare and support overt behavior (i.e., whole 
body actions and facial/vocal expressions). Aspects of this episode seep into consciousness 
where they form the content of feelings. In these theories, then, an emotional action is one of 
several components of an emotional episode and is assumed to be caused by a process in 
which the representation of certain stimulus features activates an action tendency (i.e., the 
representation of an action) characteristic of an emotion. This fits our definition of a 
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stimulus-driven process. In some theories (e.g., affect program theories, Matsumoto & 
Ekman, 2009; network theories, Lang, 1994), the stimulus features giving rise to the action 
tendency are perceptual in nature (e.g., the form of a snake spurs the tendency to avoid). In 
other theories, however, the stimulus features are more abstract. This is the case for appraisal 
theories where the abstract features are called appraisals. Examples of appraisals are goal 
in/congruence (i.e., whether a stimulus is in/congruent with a person’s goals) and high/low 
control (i.e., whether a stimulus is easy/difficult to control). Goal incongruence overlaps with 
the notion of a discrepancy between stimuli and goals in cybernetic models (cf. above), and 
high/low control indicates whether there are more/less action options with a high expectancy 
for reaching a valued outcome. Although this suggests partial overlap between the appraisal 
process and the goal-directed process, none of the current appraisal theories include an 
appraisal of the utility of specific action options afforded by a stimulus (i.e., affordances), and 
they do not hypothesize that the action tendency with the highest utility is always activated. 
Instead, specific patterns of appraisals (including goal in/congruence and high/low control) 
are hypothesized to give rise to specific action tendencies (e.g., to seek safety, attack, reject) 
that are seen as characteristic of specific emotions (e.g., fear, anger, disgust)6. Thus, the links 
between appraisal patterns and action tendencies put forward by appraisal theories do not 
count as goal-directed processes in the strict way defined here, but are better conceived of as 
sophisticated types of stimulus-driven processes. As such, they are less flexible than goal-
directed processes, and therefore may lead to less optimal action tendencies in some 
situations. Take, for instance, the hypothesis of some appraisal theories that a stimulus 
appraised as goal incongruent and difficult to control leads to the tendency to flee or avoid, a 
tendency characteristic of fear (Roseman, 2013). In typical situations in which control is low 
                                                     
6 Some appraisal theorists only link specific appraisals to specific action tendencies, without linking the latter to 
specific emotions (see Moors, 2014b). 
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(e.g., a conflict in which the person is weaker than the opponent), fleeing may be the optimal 
action, but there may be situations in which this is not true (e.g., if control is so low that 
fleeing is impossible). Likewise, fighting may be the optimal action in a typical high-control 
situation, but again, this may not always be the case (e.g., if the person has high control in the 
sense that she can flee but not fight). In sum, the processes proposed in several emotion 
theories can be classified as stimulus-driven ones, with stimulus features ranging from 
perceptual to abstract.  
Crucially, as is the case in the action domain, dual process models in the emotion 
domain hold that complexity is positively related to flexibility and hence optimality, but 
inversely related to automaticity. Thus, goal-directed processes are seen as more flexible but 
in return less automatic, whereas the stimulus-driven processes held to be involved in 
emotional actions tendencies are seen as more rigid but in return more automatic. Indeed, it is 
assumed that raising one’s voice to make someone obey is controlled, whereas raising it out 
of anger exemplifies a lack of control: The aggression spills out.  
To ensure more flexibility in the relation between stimulus features and actions, the 
emotion theories discussed here allow for a scenario in which after the stimulus-driven 
process has generated a more or less abstract action tendency, a goal-directed process takes 
over that does take into account the concrete affordances of the situation. This process either 
refines an abstract action tendency into a more concrete one (e.g., fleeing can be done by 
running, swimming, or hiding under the carpet) or it corrects it (e.g., defensive fight instead 
of flight if fleeing is impossible). Such a goal-directed process is typically called a regulation 
process (see e.g., Tamir, 2009, for empirical evidence of the role of goal-directed processes in 
emotion regulation). This resembles the default-interventionist architecture that is typical of 
some standard dual process models in the action domain. We may thus conclude that a 
similar dual process logic underlies thinking in both the domains of action and emotion.  
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 Application of our alternative dual process model to the emotion domain amounts to 
the proposal that goal-directed processes are not restricted to emotion regulation but should 
also play a role in the initial causation of emotional action tendencies. So far, only a handful 
of authors have explicitly considered this possibility (e.g., Bushman & Anderson, 2001; Eder 
& Hommel, 2013; Eder & Rothermund, 2013; Parkinson, 2008). The reason for this relative 
blind spot may be the widespread intuition that emotions have an irrational flavor. Theorists 
who define emotional actions by contrasting them with instrumental ones (cf. the dual 
process model outlined above) deny the possibility that emotional action tendencies can be 
caused by goal-directed processes. Yet if emotional actions are defined in an alternative way, 
the question becomes an empirical one. For instance, if emotional actions are defined as 
ensuing from action tendencies with control precedence (i.e., that take priority over other 
action tendencies) because these action tendencies, in turn, ensue from stimuli that are 
relevant for highly valued goals (Frijda, 2007), then there is no a priori reason to deny the 
role of goal-directed processes in the causation of emotional actions. On the contrary, if 
emotional episodes are concerned with highly goal-relevant events, it is only to hope that 
goal-directed processes will get into gear to prepare for the most optimal action. Theorists 
seem reluctant to abandon the irrational feature of emotions because they fear that it would 
turn emotions into cold decisions. Yet taking out the irrationality of emotions should not take 
out their heat: If they are defined as pertaining to highly goal-relevant events, their heat is 
preserved. Note that such an alternative definition of emotions relies on a gradual criterion: 
Episodes can be called more or less emotional. This squares well with emotion theories that 
deny a special status to emotions and their components (Russell, 2013). Instead of treating 
emotions as mysterious entities that influence cold cognitive processes involved in attention, 
perception, memory, and decision making, they can themselves be regarded as decision 
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processes, ones that rely on the very same mechanisms as non-emotional decision processes, 
but in which the stakes are higher.   
Empirical Validation of the Alternative Model 
Research on operant learning, decision making, and motivation provides abundant 
support for the role of goal-directed processes in action causation. The challenge is to show 
that so-called instances of behavior caused by stimulus-driven processes are better explained 
by goal-directed processes. The evidence reviewed by habit researchers (e.g., Wood & Neal, 
2007) and emotion researchers (Berkowitz, 1993; Matsumoto & Ekman, 2009) draws the 
image that stimulus-driven processes explain a substantial part of behavior. This seems to 
contradict the core assumption of our model that goal-directed processes are the default. In 
this section, we argue that there are problems with much of the evidence for stimulus-driven 
processes. The criteria used to diagnose stimulus-driven processes in this research range from 
weak to strong, but even strong criteria do not provide airtight guarantees about the 
underlying processes. This provides openings for future research to re-examine the role of 
goal-directed processes, and perhaps to redraw the image. 
Weak criteria 
Weak criteria for the diagnosis of stimulus-driven processes are the frequency of 
behaviors and their (experienced) automaticity. In prediction research and intervention 
studies, habit strength is measured via self-report of the frequency of behaviors and/or of the 
degree to which they appear to be automatic (Verplanken & Orbell, 2003). But also in 
experimental studies, the stimulus-driven nature of habits and affective processes is often 
inferred from their automatic nature. Take the stimulus-driven hypothesis that positive vs. 
negative stimuli are sufficient to produce approach vs. avoidance tendencies (Chen & Bargh, 
1999). This hypothesis received support from experiments in which positive vs. negative 
stimuli (i.e., pictures) led to faster instructed approach vs. avoidance responses (i.e., moving a 
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joystick or an avatar toward vs. away from the stimuli; see review by Krieglmeyer, De 
Houwer, & Deutsch, 2013). However, neither frequency nor automaticity are good indicators 
of the content of representations driving behavior. Brushing one’s teeth may remain a choice, 
even if it is made everyday and carried out in a mindless way.  
Stronger criteria 
Stronger tests of the stimulus-driven vs. goal-directed nature of the processes that 
cause behavior are ones that do target the content of the representations involved such as the 
outcome revaluation test (i.e., the desire criterion test) and the contingency degradation test 
(i.e., the belief criterion test). If a change in the value of the expected outcome leads to a 
change in the response that previously led to the outcome, then it is concluded that a 
representation of the value of the outcome mediated the response (Adams & Dickinson, 
1981). Likewise, if a change in the contingency between a response and an outcome leads to a 
change in the response that previously led to the outcome, then it is concluded that a 
representation of the contingency between the response and the outcome mediated the 
response (Balleine & Dickinson, 1998). Previous revaluation studies have shown that, after a 
moderate number of training trials in which a response is consistently followed by a specific 
positive outcome in the presence of a stimulus (S:R-posO), subsequent devaluation of the 
outcome (i.e., making it aversive by pairing it with a negative further outcome, negFO, or by 
changing the organism’s motivational state, e.g., from hunger to satiation) leads to a 
decrement in the response that previously led to this outcome (Balleine & Dickinson, 1981). 
This finding is taken as evidence that the valued outcome was part of the representation 
causing the response ([S:R-posO]). After an extensive number of training trials, however, 
subsequent devaluation of the outcome no longer results in a response, a finding that is taken 
as evidence that the valued outcome was no longer part of the representation causing the 
response ([S-R]). Notably, overtraining does not result in the typical resistance-to-devaluation 
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effect when subjects (animals or humans) have the choice between two action options 
(Colwill & Rescorla, 1985). This indicates that behavior becomes habitual only under special 
conditions, such as extensive repetition and a lack of choice.  
But even if revaluation and contingency degradation tests do show that a behavior 
does not change after changing the value and/or expectancy of its outcome, the conclusion 
that the underlying process was stimulus-driven is not airtight because it relies on null-
findings (Heyes & Dickinson, 1993). An action that is insensitive to changes in the value or 
expectancy of one outcome (the manipulated one) may still be governed by the value and 
expectancy of another outcome (that was not manipulated). The goals driving behavior 
sometimes remain invisible (to the agent as well as to the researcher) because certain 
complexities are being overlooked. We discuss four complexities.  
Four complexities 
First, a single action may have multiple outcomes (benefits and costs), some of which 
may be hidden. Some cases attest to the dominance of the value of an outcome. For instance, 
aggression may come with the cost of retaliation, but it may be conducive to repairing one’s 
damaged self-esteem and this may have a higher value. Likewise, people may endure extreme 
suffering to obtain a long-term outcome with a higher value for them (e.g., a martyr; Kopetz 
& Orehek, 2015). Other cases attest to the dominance of the expectancy of an outcome. For 
instance, a person taking drugs may be motivated by the immediate outcome of feeling high, 
and not deterred by the long-term outcome of poor health and job loss, possibly because the 
former is more vivid (Leigh, 1989) and therefore has a higher expectancy (cf. the availability 
heuristic; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  
A second complexity is that multiple actions may lead to the same outcome. An 
individual may go for a suboptimal action option (one with a high cost) because there are no 
other options. For instance, a person may choose to repair self-esteem via costly aggression 
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because less costly action options (e.g., taking the opportunity to shine in public) are not 
available. In emotion research, aggression is sometimes measured by the amount of hot sauce 
or noise blasts delivered to an opponent but other actions options are often not presented 
(Gerber & Wheeler, 2009). Thus, it is difficult to determine whether participants chose it 
because of a tendency to be aggressive or a tendency to do anything.  
A third complexity is that a single action may figure in various action-outcome links 
across contexts or times. If individuals keep records of previous action-outcome links that are 
no longer valid, these links may still sometimes be activated and drive behavior. For instance, 
smoking may breed popularity in one’s teenage years, but cease to do so in one’s adult years. 
It is possible that the old smoking-popular link was not overwritten but kept intact next to a 
new smoking-wrinkles link, and that both links are attached to different contexts (Gershman 
et al., 2013). In revaluation studies, the response decrement after moderate training may 
indicate that an old representation is overwritten by a new one, while the resistance-to-
devaluation effect after extensive training may indicate that the old representation with the 
non-devalued outcome was activated because the test phase was more similar to the training 
phase than to the devaluation phase (e.g., because they share the same set of action options; 
for a related point, see Wood & Neal, 2007, Footnote 2).  
A fourth complexity is that values and expectancies are not only determined by 
contingencies in the (recent) past, but also by meta-expectations. For instance, in contexts in 
which people believe there is a low contingency between actions and outcomes (e.g., in a 
gambling game), they may expect future outcomes to deviate from (instead of to replicate) 
previous outcomes (cf. the gamblers fallacy, e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1971). If this 
complexity is overlooked, actions erroneously may be taken to be insensitive to outcome 
expectancies.   
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Given that presumed evidence for stimulus-driven processes remains open to 
alternative interpretations, a fruitful approach would be to create variants of existing 
experiments in which the manipulation of values, expectancies, and/or meta-expectancies of 
presumed hidden goals impact on action tendencies and actions. Several labs have already 
taken this strategy. For example, Eder and Hommel (2013) review evidence obtained with the 
approach-avoidance task showing that the relation between positive vs. negative stimuli and 
approach vs. avoidance is goal-directed rather than stimulus-driven. For another example, 
Parkinson (2001) showed that the aggressive act of car honking is sensitive to the expected 
communicative effect of this behavior. Future research is needed, however, in which the goal-
directed processes are shown to determine the initial action tendency (cf. the one-step 
scenario) rather than being limited to an interventionist role (i.e., the two-step scenario).  
Implications of the Alternative Model for Behavior Change 
 The alternative view offered here yields important implications for behavior change in 
clinical practice and society.  Many existing dual process models postulate that stimulus-
driven processes dominate goal-directed ones because they are more automatic. This implies 
that therapies designed to regulate suboptimal behavior by trying harder to resist them are 
doomed to fail because they are in fact attempts to control the uncontrollable. In an effort to 
escape this gloomy fate, some theorists have proposed not to try harder but to install better 
habits (cf. approach-avoidance training; e.g., Wiers, Rinck, Kordts, Houben, & Strack, 2010), 
to re-appraise the stimulus so that it can activate a different [S-R] link, or to automatize self-
control (cf. Moskowitz, Gollwitzer, Wasel, & Schaal, 1999). However, if it would turn out 
that stimulus-driven processes play a minimal role in suboptimal behavior, installing new 
habits may not be the most promising therapy. Consistent with this idea, approach-avoidance 
training that is directed at changing habits seems to have mostly short-term effects (Asnaani, 
Rinck, Becker, Hofmann, 2014; Krypotos, Arnaudova, Effting, Kindt, & Beckers, 2015). But 
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even cases that do show long-term effects (see Wiers, Eberl, Rinck, Becker, & Lindenmeyer, 
2011) need not be explained by the strengthening of a stimulus-driven process. Repeated 
execution of an action in a certain context may increase the accessibility of the corresponding 
action option within the action repertoire (Danner, Vries, & Aarts, 2007) so that it is more 
likely to be chosen via a goal-directed process.  
If research in psychopathology would confirm that various disorders are less driven 
by rusted stimulus-driven processes, but more by—often hidden—goals, this suggest a 
therapeutic approach in which problems are analyzed with the aim of uncovering and 
changing values and expectancies. Several existing strategies fit with this approach. One 
strategy consists in changing expectancies by changing the vividness of outcomes, for 
instance via simulation or imagination training (Papies & Barsalou, 2015). This provides an 
opening for long-term goals to gain dominance over short-term ones (when the former are 
made more vivid than the latter; Watkins, 2011). But imagery may also focus on cultivating 
immediate goals (e.g., the sensory pleasures of food) so that less consumption is needed to 
satisfy them (Cornil & Chandon, in press). Another strategy consists in changing the value of 
an outcome or goal (e.g., via reappraisal of the goal). This may be easier to achieve for less 
valued (lower-order) goals than for more valued (higher-order) ones. Thus, the solution 
suggested here is not to replace higher-order goals, but to figure out less costly action options 
for reaching them. For instance, a heavy drinker who does not want to give up feeling high, 
may switch to doing sport in order to get a runner’s high. The alternative view also suggests 
more promising solutions to societal problems such as prejudice. Whereas classic dual 
process models focus on automatizing the suppression of prejudice and the installation of 
new habits (e.g., approach training toward minority members), the alternative view bets on 
strategies such as imagining the positive outcomes of increased contact (Miles & Crisp, 
2014).  
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Conclusion 
 We argued that standard dual process models overestimate the role of stimulus-driven 
processes in action causation and underestimate the role of their goal-directed counterparts. 
This is because they hold on to the assumption that stimulus-driven processes are the default 
process and goal-directed processes intervene only under special conditions. In addition, they 
tend to overlook a series of complexities when doing empirical research. We believe future 
thinking and research would benefit if the mappings between processes and operating 
conditions would be relaxed and the complexities were taken into account. Researchers and 
practitioners should focus less on stimulus-driven processes when trying to understand so-
called suboptimal behaviors and switch their attention to subtle ways in which goal-directed 
processes could guide those behaviors. 
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